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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
After this case was remanded for a restitution hearing because the State had not 
presented sufficient evidence in support of its restitution request (it relied only on the 
prosecutor's unsworn oral assertion of the time he spent and his rate of pay), the district 
court entered a higher restitution award based on the same information (the 
prosecutor's still-unsworn representation, this time, presented in a written document). 
Ms. Nelson appeals again, contending that the restitution award in this case should be 
vacated for several reasons: the restitution statute (1.C. § 37-2732(k)) is 
unconstitutional as applied to her; the increased restitution award, which was not based 
on new information, constituted vindictive sentencing by the district court; and the State 
again failed to meet its burden of proof in the restitution hearing. 
The State has not contested one of the points Ms. Nelson raised - that the 
restitution award in this case is erroneous because it includes restitution for time spent 
solely prosecuting Ms. Nelson's co-defendant on a persistent violator charge; rather, it 
simply disputes the proper remedy for that error. (See Resp. Br., p.25 (arguing for an 
opportunity to adjust the claim accordingly on remand).) Based on that apparent 
concession, this Court should grant some form of relief in this case. Thus, the only 
question is whether this Court should remand this case at all, and, if it does, whether 
and what instructions it should give to the district court about the rules applicable to an 
ensuing decision. The State makes several responses to Ms. Nelson's arguments on 
these other issues, none of which are meritorious. 
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such, Ms. Nelson maintains that, since the State has already had two 
opportunities to meet its burden of proof regarding restitution and has failed to present 
any evidence, much less sufficient evidence, in support of its claim for restitution both 
times, this Court should not remand this case again. Instead, it should simply vacate 
the order for restitution. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Ms. Nelson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred in ordering Ms. Nelson to pay $4,746 in restitution for 
prosecution costs in this case. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Ordering Ms. Nelson To Pay $4,746 In Restitution For The 
Prosecution Costs In This Case 
A. The Restitution Statute Is Unconstitutional As It Is Applied To Ms. Nelson 
1 The State's Attempt To Bar Ms. Nelson's As-Applied Challenge Under The 
Law Of The Case Doctrine Misunderstands That Doctrine 
Despite focusing its argument on the merits of Ms. Nelson's challenge to the 
constitutionality of employing I.C. § 37-2732(k) against her (see Resp. Br., pp.6-10), the 
State "questions whether [this] claim is barred by law of the case." (Resp. Br., p.6 n.2.) 
The answer to the State's question is, "No, it is not." That answer is based on a proper 
understanding of what the law of the case doctrine requires in terms of raising issues 
prior to a remand. 
As the Idaho Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed, "the law of the case 
doctrine 'prevents consideration on a subsequent appeal of alleged errors that might 
have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appeal."' State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 
72 (2013) (quoting Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709 (2009) (emphasis added). If the 
record in the earlier appeal is insufficient for the party in question to have raised the 
issue, then the law of the case doctrine does not prevent that party from raising the 
issue for the first time on the ensuing remand. Id. 
That is the case here. The record in the initial appeal was not sufficient for 
Ms. Nelson to have raised the constitutional challenge in the initial appeal, primarily 
because it had not been preserved to the district court beforehand. That conclusion is 
particularly obvious in this case given the fact that, prior to the first appeal, defense 
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counsel had asked for an evidentiary hearing to explore the validity of the prosecutor's 
unsworn representation at the sentencing hearing, but was denied in that request. 
State v. Nelson, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No.387, 2014 WL 708467, p.4 (Ct 
App. 2014), rev. denied. It was at such a hearing that defense counsel would be 
expected reasonably to have raised the constitutional challenge, and that is precisely 
what happened, when the case was remanded for that hearing. 
Since that issue was not raised, nor could it have been effectively raised, in the 
initial appeal, the law of the case doctrine does not bar Ms. Nelson from raising the as-
applied challenge for the first time on the ensuing remand. Thus, the issue is 
appropriately asserted in this appeal. 
2. The State's Argument As To The Merits Of The As-Applied Challenge 
Misunderstands, And So, Misapplies The United States Supreme Court's 
Precedent On That Point 
Ms. Nelson argues that, pursuant to United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 
(1968), ordering her to pay restitution pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732(k) is unconstitutional 
because it would create the impermissible effect of objectively appearing to punish her 
for exercising her rights, and so, chill the exercise of the constitutional right to a trial. 
(See App. Br., pp.8-16) The State responds, asserting that the rule in Jackson has not 
been embraced by subsequent decisions, and so, no longer constitutes good law. 
(Resp. Br., pp.9-10.) The State misunderstands those subsequent decisions. 
Jackson clearly remains good law, as the United States Supreme Court 
continues to apply it when the facts warrant it. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 
499 n.11 (1999) (reiterating and relying upon the Jackson rule). The State's argument 
to the contrary is based on the analysis in the Ninth Circuit case, United 
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States v. Chavez, 627 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1980). However, the State's argument ignores 
details of the Ninth Circuit's analysis. Those details reveal that Ms. Nelson's as-
applied challenge is actually still a valid argument to raise even under Chavez. 
Chavez, like a line of United States Supreme Court decisions before it, simply 
recognizes that Jackson does not establish a per se rule of unconstitutionality whenever 
a statute impacts the exercise of a constitutional right; rather, those decisions recognize 
that application of the Jackson rule depends on the specific facts and statutes at issue 
in a particular case. Chavez, 627 F.2d at 956; see, e.g., Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 
U.S. 212, 218-19 (1978). Thus, the rule emerges: "not every assertion that a statutory 
scheme has chilled the exercise of a constitutional right results in the finding of 
unconstitutionality." Chavez, 627 F.2d at 956 (emphasis added). 
Ms. Nelson does not actually make any claim to the contrary. She has not 
argued that I.C. § 37-2732(k) could never be constitutionally applied (i.e., made an 
argument that it is facially unconstitutional). (See generally App. Br.) Rather, she 
claims that, based on the unique facts of her case and the particular statute at issue, 
I.C. § 37-2732(k) is unconstitutional as it has been applied to her. (App. Br., pp.15.) 
Chavez itself reaffirms that this sort of claim is a proper and viable claim to raise, as it 
explains, while there may be legitimate government interests in a statute, such that 
costs of prosecution may be authorized "for [another] purpose or effect than to chill the 
assertion of constitutional rights . . . The question remains, however, whether the 
provision is constitutionally infirm because it needlessly encourages the waiver of 
constitutional rights." Chavez, 627 F.2d at 956 (emphasis added). 
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Thus, the flaw in the State's argument becomes evident. Those other decisions 
not hold that Jackson was wrong, or rule is no longer good law. Rather, they 
distinguished Jackson based on the specific facts and statutes at issue in those 
subsequent cases. For example: 
[Fuller v. Oregon], the Court said, was fundamentally different from those 
decisions which invalidated laws that placed a penalty on the exercise of a 
constitutional right [i.e., Jackson]. "Oregon's system for providing counsel 
quite clearly does not deprive any defendant of the legal assistance 
necessary to meet (their) needs. An indigent's knowledge that he might 
someday be required to repay the costs of his legal services in no way 
affect his eligibility to obtain counsel 
Chavez, 627 F.2d at 956 (quoting Fulmer v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 52 (1974) (emphasis 
added). What Fulmer actually stands for, according the Supreme Court itself, is that, 
where the statute in question is appropriately tailored to address the government 
interests, such that it does not needlessly chill the exercise of the right, the Jackson rule 
does not apply. Fulmer, 417 U.S. at 54. 
The Jackson rule did not apply in Corbitt for similar reasons: "The Court upheld 
the New Jersey statute [at issue in that case] and stated that Jackson did not require 
otherwise. 'The principal difference is that the pressures to forgo trial and plead guilty to 
the charge [in Corbitt] are not what they were in Jackson."' Chavez, 627 F.2d at 956 
(quoting Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 218). Specifically, the Supreme Court explained that, while 
the guilty plea process will impact on the trial right, that burden was not "needless" 
because the guilty plea still had to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in regard to the 
waiver of the trial right Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 219 n.9; see a/so id. at 220-21. 
Ms. Nelson's case is more like Jackson than Fulmer and Corbitt because the 
effect of enforcing I.C. § 37-2732(k) in this case does directly punish Ms. Nelson's 
7 
choice to exercise her right to a trial. (See App. Br., pp.13-16.) That is particularly 
from the fact that Ms. Nelson had stand on her rights during the first trial so 
that she would not be deprived of a fair trial by the improper presentation of evidence 
during the State's case. (See, e.g., Supp. R., pp.154-55 (documenting the mistrial).) 
Despite that fact, the State has now sought and received an order for restitution for the 
time the prosecutor spent preparing for and appearing at the second trial. (See, e.g., 
R., pp.38-39 (order for restitution attempting to exclude only the time the prosecutor 
spent in court for the first trial, not the time preparing for that trial).) The time to prepare 
for and present the second trial was only necessary because the State erred in its first 
presentation of the case. Thus, forcing Ms. Nelson to pay the costs of that prosecution 
is a needless burden on the exercise of her right to a fair trial. Compare Corbitt, 439 
U.S. at 220-21, 219 n.9 (finding the imposition of the burden on the affected right was 
narrowly tailored to the purpose and thus, not "needless"); Fulmer. 417 U.S at 54 
(same). This is also true as it relates to Ms. Nelson's decision to stand on her right to a 
trial in the first place. (App. Br., pp.13-16.) 
It is important to remember that the applicable analysis is objective. It considers 
whether a reasonable person (which encompasses the perspective of others still 
incarcerated), would see the act as a punishment for exercising a constitutional right, 
such that they would not exercise that right themselves for fear of being subjected to the 
same punishment. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969) (quoting 
Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581-82). Since an objective review of the facts in Ms. Nelson's 
case shows she was subjected to higher restitution because of her decision to exercise 
her rights to a jury trial and a fair trial, a reasonable person would see the order for 
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restitution as punishment against Ms. Nelson for exercising her rights, and, as a result, 
reasonable person would not exercise rights for fear of similar reprisal. 
Therefore, as in Jackson, enforcing that statute caused a needless chill upon the 
exercise of the rights afforded by the Constitution. Thus, I.C § 37-2732(k) is 
unconstitutional as it was applied to Ms. Nelson. (App. Br., pp.8-16.) 
As such, the State's arguments against Jackson, which fail to appreciate the 
whole body of precedent and the distinctions drawn between the relevant cases, are 
erroneous and should be rejected. Based on a proper understanding of precedent, this 
Court should vacate the restitution order in this case because ordering it violates 
Ms. Nelson's constitutional rights. 
B The District Court's Decision To Order Restitution For A Higher Amount Than 
The One Originally Vacated Without New Evidence Affirmatively Appearing in 
The Record To Support That Order Was Vindictive 
The State makes two arguments in regard to the merits of Ms. Nelson's vindictive 
sentencing claim1: (1) since the district court examined the record to try and understand 
its error, its decision was not malicious, and so, was not vindictive; (2) the Pearce 
presumption2 does not apply to the remand in this case, since the point of the initial 
remand was to allow for the presentation of new evidence. (Resp. Br., pp.14-19.) 
Neither of these arguments is meritorious, since (1) Ms. Nelson is not required to show 
actual vindictive intent or malice by the district court judge to show vindictive 
1 As will be discussed in Section 8(1 )(b), infra, the restitution in this case under this 
particular statute qualifies as a punitive consequence of conviction, and so, may be 
challenged as vindictive "sentencing." 
2 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726 (holding that, if the same court orders a higher sentence on 
remand, it is presumed to be vindictive). 
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it 
, and (2) even though the State had the opportunity to present new evidence, 
take advantage of that opportunity. 
However, it is first necessary to discuss the State's procedural argument in 
regard to the whether this claim needs to be analyzed under the fundamental error 
standard. (Resp. Br., pp.12-14.) This claim is adequately preserved for appeal 
pursuant to State v. Grist, 152 Idaho 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2012), and State v. DuValt, 131 
Idaho 550, 553 (1998). However, even if this Court decides otherwise, this claim is not 
only cognizable under the fundamental error framework, but Ms. Nelson has met all 
three prongs of that test, as well. Either way, this Court should consider the merits of 
this claim, and in so doing, vacate the order for restitution in this case. 
1. The Vindictive Sentencing Claim Is Properly Raised In This Appeal 
a. The Vindictive Sentencing Claim Was Adequately Preserved For 
Appeal 
The State's argument - that the vindictive sentencing claim was not adequately 
preserved for appeal (Resp. Br., pp.12-14) - is based on a misunderstanding of the 
difference between a claim of vindictive sentencing and vindictive prosecution. The 
State believes that, since Ms. Nelson could have argued the prosecutor's request for 
restitution was vindictive, she had an opportunity to raise the question of vindictiveness 
generally, and thus, cannot raise the issue of vindictive sentencing by the district court 
for the first time on appeal (See Resp. Br., p.12.) That is incorrect. 
In fact, as the Idaho Court of Appeals has said, a defendant is "not required to 
make a contemporaneous objection to the district court at the time of resentencing to 
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afford the district court an opportunity to rebut the Pearce presumption."3 Id. The 
reason behind that conclusion is: "We agree with the majority of federal circuits, and 
specifically with the dissent in Vonsteen[4], that the Supreme Court's use of the word 
'must' in Pearce means that, in imposing a more severe sentence upon remand, the 
district court bears the burden to make the reasons for such sentence part of the 
record." Grist, 152 Idaho at 794. "Otherwise," the Court of Appeals acknowledged, 
"Pearce's holding loses its meaning." Id As such, this issue of vindictive sentencing by 
the district court is properly presented for the first time on appeal. 
The State's assertion that the claim should and could have been presented as a 
challenge to the prosecutor's request for restitution also fails to appreciate the 
difference between vindictive sentencing and vindictive prosecution. That distinction is 
based on the actor whose actions are being challenged: "Unlike the circumstances 
presented fin previous] cases, however, in the situation here the central figure is not the 
judge or the jury, but the prosecutor." Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974). 
Thus, vindictive sentencing occurs because "due process also requires that a defendant 
be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing 
judge." Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725 (emphasis added). Contrarily, in vindictive prosecution 
claims, it is the prosecutor's charging decisions which are improperly retaliatory. See 
Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 27-28. 
3 This statement appears to be dicta, as the defendant in Grist had raised his claim of 
vindictive sentencing solely under the fundamental error standard, and so, the Court 
was only analyzing the claim under the fundamental standard. See Grist, 152 Idaho at 
791-95. However, as it is consistent with the majority rule from other courts, and the 
Grist Court's rationale regarding the propriety of that rule is sound, this Court should 
continue applying that rationale. 
4 United States v. Vonsteen, 950 F.2d 1086, 1094 (5th Cir. 1992). 
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this case, Ms. Nelson has raised only a vindictive sentencing claim based on 
court's restitution order. (App. Br., pp.1 An argument against the 
request for restitution would not have been a sufficient opportunity to 
challenge the district court's ensuing actions because, by its nature, a claim of vindictive 
sentencing can only be raised after the district court makes a sentencing decision. Until 
the district court has made such a decision, there is nothing for the defendant to 
challenge or argue about. Since the defendant has to wait for the district court to 
actually render that decision, she will not have a meaningful opportunity to challenge the 
district court's decision in the hearing preceding that decision (See Tr., p.48, Ls.3-6 
(the district court indicating that, once the parties briefed the issue, it would consider the 
matter fully submitted for its subsequent decision).) This is precisely why the Idaho 
Supreme Court has held a decision by the district court on an issue will preserve that 
issue for appeal. DuValt, 131 Idaho at 553. Therefore, Ms. Nelson has properly 
challenged the district court's restitution decision for the first time on appeal under the 
DuValt rationale. 
Furthermore, the fact that there are other arguments the defendant might have, 
but did not, raise does not mean that the argument she did raise was improper or 
incorrect. Thus, the strawman argument the State identified (and responded to by 
calling it a "disingenuous" representation of the facts (Resp. Br., p.13)) is based on a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the claim Ms. Nelson actually raised. As such, that 
strawman argument should be rejected. 
Applying the proper analysis, this Court should consider the merits of the issue 
Ms. Nelson actually raised as preserved error. 
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b. Alternatively, The Claim Of Vindictive Sentencing In A Restitution 
Order May Be Raised As Fundamental Error 
Even if this Court determines Ms. Nelson's challenge to vindictive sentencing 
was not sufficiently preserved under Grist and DuValt, it can still review that decision as 
fundamental error. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010) (defining the 
fundamental error test). 
As an initial matter, the State asserts that, because restitution is a civil 
proceeding attendant to the criminal case, Ms. Nelson cannot challenge a restitution 
order as fundamental error. (Resp. Br., p.13 (citing State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 
833 (Ct. App. 2010).) The State's reliance on Mosqueda is misplaced, and Mosqueda 
is itself revealed to be an improper decision, because restitution has, and continues to 
be, successfully challenged as fundamental error. See, e.g., Grist, 152 Idaho at 791-95 
(finding vindictive sentencing constituted fundamental error post-Perry and post-
Mosqueda); State v. Robbins, 123 Idaho 527, 530 (1993) (same, pre-Perry). Those 
decisions are proper because, as the United States Supreme Court and the Idaho Court 
of Appeals have recognized, a civil penalty may actually be so punitive as to rise to the 
level of criminal punishment. See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) 
("Even in those cases where the legislature 'has indicated an intention to establish a 
civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either 
in purpose or effect, as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a 
criminal penalty.") (internal quotations omitted); Buell v. Idaho Dep't of Transportation, 
151 Idaho 257, 262 (Ct. App. 2011) (identifying and applying the Hudson factors); 
State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 622-23 (Ct. App. 2001) (same). 
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As such, contrary to the State's position, the mere fact that restitution occurs in a 
does not ipso facto mean that it cannot be reviewed as a criminal 
penalty. Furthermore, the State has not refuted Ms. Nelson's analysis that the 
restitution order in this case was so punitive that it rises to the level of criminal 
punishment. (See App. Br., pp.9-13; see generally Resp. Br.) Thus, as is uncontested 
by the State, the restitution award under I.C. § 37-2732(k), by the plain language of that 
statute, establishes a punitive punishment which is subject to vindictive sentencing 
analysis. (See App. Br., pp.9-13.) Thus, such a claim may be raised as fundamental 
error if it was not adequately preserved below. See, e.g., Grist, 152 Idaho at 794; 
Robbins, 123 Idaho at 530. 
That also means the decision in Mosqueda, upon which the State relies in this 
regard, is manifestly wrong, since it does not comport with this understanding of the 
plain language of I.C. § 37-2732(k). See, e.g. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. 
Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011) (holding that, if the plain language of the statute, read 
as a whole, is clear, the courts are to give effect to the law as written). The State has 
made no effort to defend the propriety of the Mosqueda decision in light of these other 
decisions, such as the subsequent decision in Buell and Grist. ( Compare App. Br., p.13 
n.4 (asserting that Mosqueda should be overruled or recognized as abrogated based on 
its inconsistency with these other decisions).) Therefore, in rejecting the State's 
argument on this point, this Court should also overrule, or at least recognize as 
abrogated, the decision in Mosqueda, as it is manifestly wrong and doing so is 
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law set forth by the United States 
Supreme Court, which have been recognized and adopted by the Idaho courts. See, 
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e.g., Houghland Farms v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77 (1990) (discussing the standard 
overruling precedent). 
Since restitution under LC. § 37-2732(k) is a punitive consequence of the 
conviction, this means that, if this Court decides this issue must be analyzed under the 
fundamental error framework, as discussed in depth the Appellant's Brief at page 16, 
Ms. Nelson has satisfied the three prongs of that test: it constitutes a prejudicial 
violation of her unwaived constitutional rights clear from the face of the record. 
2. The State's Arguments On The Merits Of The Vindictive Sentencing Claim 
Are Erroneous 
a. Since The State Did Not Present New Evidence On Remand, The 
Pearce Presumption Of Vindictiveness Applies In This Case 
Even if this Court concludes that Ms. Nelson has not shown vindictiveness on the 
record, the presumption of vindictiveness, which exists if the same judge imposes a 
harsher sentence on remand, applies in this case. See, e.g., Alabama v. Smith, 490 
U.S. 794, 798-99 (1989), Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726. As it is a presumption of error, the 
State bears the burden to prove the presumption inapplicable to the facts of the case. 
See Smith, 490 U.S. at 798-99. To meet that burden, the State must show the harsher 
sentence is based on new information "affirmatively appear[ing]" in the record before the 
district court on remand. See id. at 800-01; Pearce, 395 U.S. at 740. 
In that regard, the Smith Court held that presumption does not apply after a new 
trial under the common-sense idea that actually having a trial will inevitably present 
information that had not been presented during a previous guilty-plea proceeding. See 
Smith, 490 U.S. at 801 (1989) ("[T]he relevant sentencing information available to the 
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judge after the plea will usually be considerably less than that available after a trial."). 
it was because there was sufficient evidence in the record, as a result of the new 
evidence actually presented at the trial, which distinguished Smith from Pearce. Id. at 
801-02 ("[W]e think there are enough justifications for a heavier second sentence that it 
cannot be said to be more likely than not that a judge who imposes one is motivated by 
vindictiveness."). Nevertheless, the Smith Court reaffirmed, "any unexplained change in 
the sentence is therefore subject to a presumption of vindictiveness." Id. at 802. 
As such, this is not a matter of Ms. Nelson wanting the Court to enter the same 
order on remand (see Resp. Br., p.16), but rather, it is a demand, supported by United 
States Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals' precedent, for the State to have met 
its burden in refuting the Pearce presumption by actually presenting new information to 
justify the district court's enlarged order for restitution on remand. After all, if the higher 
restitution is upheld without such a showing, the rule from Pearce will have no meaning. 
Grist, 152 Idaho at 794. 
The language in Smith also disproves the State's other argument on this issue -
that, solely because the case is remanded with the intent for new information to be 
presented, Pearce will not apply regardless of what actually happens below. (See 
Resp. Br., pp.16-18.) The State reads Smith too broadly. The fundamental point in 
vindictive sentencing cases is that a harsher sentence must be justified by new 
information actually presented to the district court, such that the "the reasons for [the 
harsher penalty] must affirmatively appear," in the record. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 740 
(emphasis added); cf. Smith, 490 U.S. at 802. Thus, the mere possibility that new 
information will be presented is insufficient to avoid the Pearce presumption; there must 
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actually be information which the district court did not have the first time around 
presented on the record. 
However, in this case, despite the intent for a more extensive hearing, the 
prosecutor did not present any new information in support of the request for restitution 
after the remand. Instead, he presented the same information in a different form. 
(Compare R., p.25; with Tr., p.11, Ls.22-23.) In fact, the State concedes the substance 
of the prosecutor's request on remand was the same, in that "[t]he amount requested 
was the same." (Resp. Br., p.23.) Despite that concession, the State attempts to cast 
the prosecutor's repackaged, unsworn request, as "new" information. (See, e.g., Resp. 
Br., p.23 ("[O]n remand, the state submitted an exhibit reflecting the basis for the state's 
request (Exhibit 1) .... "); Resp. Br., p.18 ("On remand, the only evidence presented 
was that the rate [of the prosecutor's pay] is $140.00 per hour. (Exhibit 1.)").) 
The fact that prosecutor's representation was presented in a written document 
does not, ipso facto, give that representation the same effect as sworn testimony, and 
thus, does not make it actual evidence. In such cases, where a claim for restitution is 
not based upon actual evidence, such as sworn representations, "the prosecutor's 
unsupported representations cannot be relied upon as evidence of the existence of a 
contract [for restitution], even under the low evidentiary standards" that exist in 
restitution proceedings. State v. Cheeney, 144 Idaho 294, 299 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(rejecting the State's attempt to rely upon the unsworn statement of the purported 
victim). To that point, in Ms. Nelson's first appeal, the Court of Appeals held the 
prosecutor's representation was not enough to meet this burden: "The state failed to 
present any evidence supporting the amount requested." Nelson 2014 WL 708467, p.3. 
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Rather, this is an example of the long-recognized distinction between an 
arguments and actual, admissible evidence: 
The complaint was countered only by a terse, unverified answer 
containing a general denial by the debtor's attorney. The answer alleged 
no facts and contained no statement that the denial was based upon the 
attorney's personal knowledge of facts in the case. Unswom statements 
are entitled to no probative weight in passing on motions for summary 
judgment. Moreover, mere denials unaccompanied by facts admissible in 
evidence, and affidavits of counsel based upon hearsay rather than upon 
personal knowledge are insufficient to raise genuine issues of material 
fact. 
Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878, 882 (Ct. App. 1984) (emphasis added). Thus, absent 
the prosecutor actually being sworn to the statement, the statement does not have 
probative weight, and so, does not constitute evidence in determining whether the State 
has met its threshold burden of proof. See id. The district court specifically noted 
Exhibit 1 was not sworn. (Tr., p.45, Ls.13-14.) Thus, the unsworn statement, despite 
being submitted as a written exhibit, does not constitute actual evidence. 
Furthermore, the prosecutor's statement said, "I reviewed the time log in this 
case," and represented the time his entire office spent on the case based on the time 
log. (R., p.25.) Thus, his unsworn statement also is based upon hearsay - what the 
time log said based on the entries of an untold number of persons - and so, is further 
revealed to not be proper evidence under Camp. See I.R.E. 801 (c) (defining such 
statements as hearsay); Camp, 107 Idaho at 882 (holding that "affidavits of counsel 
based upon hearsay rather than upon personal knowledge are insufficient to raise 
genuine issues of material fact"). This further reveals the State's assertion that the 
prosecutor's statement was evidence to be erroneous. 
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In fact, this sort of repackaging of information has been found to be insufficient to 
a similar fundamental burden of proof when the party bearing that burden is 
required to present new information - motions for leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35. When 
making such motions, the defendant must support his request with new or additional 
information that had not been presented to the district court at sentencing. State v. 
Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). However, information that was considered at the 
sentencing hearing and which is simply repackaged and presented in a different manner 
or under a different guise will not satisfy the Huffman standard. For example, "[t]he 
letters from family and friends [the defendant] submitted in support of her Rule 35 
motion cannot be truly considered 'new' as they simply purport to provide additional 
information as to her mental health, a factor we have already determined adequately 
considered by the district court at sentencing." State v. Quintana, 155 Idaho 124, 133 
(Ct. App. 2013). Similarly, "even though not all of this information was specifically 
mentioned by trial counsel at the sentencing hearing, [the defendant's] motion 
presented no new information for the district court to consider in reducing her 
sentences." State v. Halbes/eben, 147 Idaho 161, 170 (Ct. App. 2009). Thus, just as 
the repackaged information in Quintana and Halbesleben was not "new" information 
under Huffman, the State's written request for restitution, which reiterated information it 
had already presented in regard to its previous request, did not constitute "new" 
information which would justify avoidance of the Pearce presumption. 
For all those reasons, even though the prosecutor, as an attorney, is expected to 
be honest in his representations to the court, his unsworn statement does not constitute 
evidence which would support the claim for restitution. See Cheeney, 144 Idaho at 299; 
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Camp, 107 Idaho at 882; see also State v. Fernandez, 124 Idaho 381, 383 n.1 (1993) 
prosecutor's questioning clearly did not constitute evidence."); cf ICJI 202 
(indicating the district court should instruct jurors, as a matter of law, that "[c]ertain 
things you have heard and seen are not evidence, including arguments and statements 
by lawyers. Lawyers are not witnesses."). Therefore, the fact that the information was 
presented in a written document does not make the information therein (the 
prosecutor's unsworn assertion of loss) any different than his original, oral, and unsworn 
representation. The State's argument to the contrary only serves to inappropriately 
exalt form over substance. Compare, e.g .. State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355 (2003) 
(quoting Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 235 237 (1969) (reiterating that such arguments are 
inappropriate because "'[s]ubstance not form governs'"). 
This same analysis disproves the State's assertion that, because the district 
court considered the transcript of the previous hearing to try and identify its error, there 
was new evidence. (See Resp. Br., pp.16. 21.) By its very nature, the information from 
a previous hearing is information that was presented to the district court the first time 
around. As such, it is not "new" information which could justify an increased sentence, 
particularly where, as here, the same judge presided over both hearings. ( See Supp. 
R., p.244; R., p.24.) 
Thus, despite the fact that the State was given the opportunity to present new 
evidence on remand, which might have justified a larger restitution order, it did not take 
advantage of that opportunity. Therefore, the district court ordered a more significant 
amount of restitution based on the same, repackaged information it considered prior to 
the first appeal. Because no new information affirmatively appears in the record to 
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justify the district court's harsher restitution order in this case, the Pearce presumption 
still applies. Smith, 490 U.S. at 802 ("[A]ny unexplained change in the sentence is 
therefore subject to a presumption of vindictiveness."); Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726 ("[W]e 
have concluded that whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a 
defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear."). As 
a result, this Court should vacate the restitution order entered in this case based on the 
presumption of vindictiveness. 
b. Ms. Nelson Does Not Need To Prove Malicious Intent On The 
District Court's Part In Order To Make A Valid Claim Of Actual 
Vindictive 
Even if this Court determines the Pearce presumption is not applicable in this 
case, Ms. Nelson has still shown actual vindictiveness in the district court's actions. To 
that point, the State erroneously contends that, to make such a claim, Ms. Nelson would 
need to show the district court acted with malice. (See Resp. Br., p.22 (going on to 
argue that, because the district court took the time to review the record to try and 
identify its error, its decision on remand was not malicious, and so, did not constitute 
vindictive sentencing).) However, the question of whether there was "actual 
vindictiveness" is an objective one: the defendant only needs to show that the district 
court's actions, viewed objectively, might cause a reasonable person in the defendant's 
situation to fear that a retaliatory motivation existed, and that apprehension would chill 
the reasonable person's exercise of a constitutional right. See, e.g .. Blackledge, 417 
U.S. at 28. 
Thus, as the United States Supreme Court has made clear: 'The question is not 
whether the chilling effect is 'incidental' rather than intentional; the question is whether 
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the effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive." Jackson, 390 U.S. at 582 
(emphasis added). Therefore, as was summarized in Narin v. State, 837 So.2d 
519, 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), the term "actual vindictiveness·' is a term of art 
indicating that the record actually shows the decision to be vindictive, rather than the 
judge acted with malice. (Appellant's Brief, p.18 n.5 (quoting Narin's summary of this 
point).) The district court's actions in this case, viewed objectively, have the prohibited 
effect, and therefore, are vindictive even if there was no malicious intent on the part of 
the district court judge. 
Properly applying the objective review standard in this context, the courts look to 
the totality of the circumstances to determine if the district court's actions were 
vindictive. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 153 Idaho 692, 695 (Ct. App. 2012); 
State v. Regester, 106 Idaho 296, 300 (Ct. App. 1986). Because the State fails to 
appreciate this proper standard for reviewing a claim of vindictive sentencing, it also 
fails to appreciate the point Ms. Nelson made as to one of the relevant circumstances, 
namely the district court's statement, "Whenever I got the [C]ourt of [A]ppeals decision, I 
looked at it and thought good grief. What was it that I did?" (App. Br., p.19 (quoting Tr., 
p.40, Ls.12-14).) Ms. Nelson has not argued, as the State believes, that this statement 
shows the district court was actually malicious, or otherwise proves vindictiveness by 
itself. (See Resp. Br., p.22; compare App., Br., p.21 n.21 (acknowledging "[t]he judge's 
comments alone do not conclusively prove or disprove an assertion of vindictiveness").) 
Rather, she has contended, and continues to contend, that statement speaks to 
one of the relevant factors in the totality the circumstances, specifically, whether the 
judge imposing the new sentence "ha[s] a stake in the prior conviction or any motivation 
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discourage defendants from seeking appellate review." Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 27. 
district court's statement evidences desire to make decisions correctly the first 
time, and thus, reveals its stake in the upholding the validity of its prior decision. 
Compare Colton v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972) (explaining that the court 
has a stake in the prior conviction if, on remand, "the court is asked to do over what it 
thought it had already done correctly"). Because the district court has an interest in not 
having its decisions overturned, and so, not have to "do over what it thought it had 
already done correctly," that fact, viewed objectively, indicates the higher restitution 
order on remand would discourage such appeals against its orders. As a result, it was 
"vindictive," even if the district court had no malicious intent. See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 
582 (holding the important consideration is the effect, intentional or otherwise, of the 
district court's actions); compare Colton, 407 U.S. at 116-17. 
In this regard, it is important to remember that the reason such orders are 
prohibited is that the unconstitutional impact is not limited to the defendant at bar, but 
extends to other defendants in future cases· "[T]he very threat inherent in the existence 
of such a punitive policy would, with respect to those still in prison, serve to 'chill the 
exercise of basic constitutional rights."' Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724 (quoting Jackson, 390 
U.S. at 581-82). That is all that is necessary to establish a claim of vindictive 
sentencing, and it is what Ms. Nelson has argued in this case. That argument, which is 
proper according to several decisions of the United States Supreme Court, is thus, not 
the "stretch" the State believes it to be. (Resp. Br., p.16.) 
Rather, along with the other relevant factors in this case - such as the fact that 
the same judge continued to preside on this matter after remand, and the fact that the 
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prosecutor presented the same request for restitution (i.e., no new information) (see 
App. Br., pp.16-19 (discussing these factors in detail))5 - the totality of the 
circumstances shows the district court's decision to order a larger award of credit on 
remand, viewed objectively, presents a reasonable apprehension that a retaliatory 
motivation existed in that order, such that the reasonable apprehension would chill the 
exercise of a constitutional right Therefore, the district court's order for restitution 
should be vacated as actually vindictive regardless of whether the district court had 
actual malice in entering the higher restitution order. 
C. The State Has Not Met Its Fundamental Burden To Prove Its Actual Economic 
Loss Attributable To The Conduct For Which Ms. Nelson Was Convicted, 
Meaning The Order For Restitution Is Improper 
In regard to the arguments on the merits of the district court's decision, it is 
necessary to step back and return to the basic principles of restitution. Fundamentally, 
the State bears the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
actual, economic loss for which it is seeking restitution was caused by the conduct for 
which the defendant was actually convicted. See, e.g., State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 
491, 495-96 (Ct. App. 2012). When the State has the opportunity to present sufficient 
evidence and fails to meet this burden, the resulting order for restitution should be 
vacated. See, e.g., State v. McNeil, 158 Idaho 280, 286 (Ct. App.2014) (vacating a 
5 The State has not challenged Ms. Nelson's arguments in regard to the fact that the 
same judge presided over the case on remand. (See generally Resp. Br.) Its 
arguments about whether the prosecutor presented the same information and request 
for restitution are not persuasive for the reasons discussed in detail in Section B(2)(b), 
infra. 
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restitution award and not allowing the State another chance to provide sufficient 
to prove the award). 
The State does not contest Ms. Nelson's claim that the order for restitution in this 
case improperly includes restitution for the time the prosecutor spent addressing the 
persistent violator charge alleged solely against Ms. Nelson's co-defendant. (Resp. 
Br., p.25 (arguing only about the appropriate remedy for an error in that regard).) 
Therefore, regardless of any other arguments, the restitution award in this case should 
be vacated because it includes restitution for a loss not attributable the conduct for 
which Ms. Nelson was convicted. See Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 495-96. Thus, because 
of that apparent concession of error, the only question is whether the case should be 
remanded to allow the State a third attempt to meet its burden 
The answer is "no" because, unlike the previous appeal, the State had the 
opportunity to meet its burden at a hearing, but failed to do so. (See App. Br., pp.32-33 
(discussing in depth the precedent revealing this to be the proper remedy in such 
situations).) As discussed in depth in Section B(2)(b), supra, the State did not present 
any new evidence on remand. Rather, it repackaged the unsworn statement it had 
originally presented. That information has already been determined to be insufficient to 
meet the State's fundamental burden of proof by the Court of Appeals. State v. Nelson, 
2014 Unpublished Opinion No.387, 2014 WL 708467, p.4 (Ct. App. 2014), rev. denied. 
Thus, proper application of the law of the case doctrine means that same information 
cannot be used to satisfy the State's fundamental burden of proof on remand. At any 
rate, there were two other reasons the information is not sufficient to meet the State's 
burden to prove its loss: the information in the prosecutor's unsworn. written statement 
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was inaccurate; and, it improperly included time attributable to charges (injury to a child) 
which Ms. Nelson was not convicted, and on one charge, actually acquitted. In fact, 
restitution for that time was not authorized by the statute even if Ms. Nelson had been 
convicted on those charges. The State's arguments on each of those points is not 
persuasive. 
Therefore since each of those reasons independently demonstrates why the 
State has failed to carry its fundamental burden at the restitution hearing, this Court 
should just vacate the restitution award and not remand to allow the State a third bite at 
the apple. 
1 Proper Application Of The Law Of The Case Doctrine Means The 
Repackaged Unsworn Statement Upon Which The State Solely Relied 
Below Is Not Sufficient To Support The Restitution Award 
The State does not contest Ms. Nelson's argument that, if the restitution order 
below were based on the same information the Court of Appeals found insufficient on 
the first appeal, the order would violate the law of the case doctrine. (See App. 
Br., pp.23-24; see generally Resp. Br .. pp.20-26.) Rather, it tries to argue that the 
information presented on remand was not the same as the information presented prior 
to the first appeal because it presented its request in a written document.6 (R., p.23.) 
However, as discussed in depth in Section B(2)(b), supra, the written statement did not 
6 The prosecutor did argue below that the document presented in Exhibit 1 had been 
part of the original presentence materials (PSI), and had been ignored in the initial 
appeal. (R., p.27 n.4.) However, that document is not in the PSI included in in the 
original record (of which, this Court took judicial notice in this appeal) nor is it in the 
addendum to that PSI included with the record in this appeal. (See generally PSI; 
Supp. PSI.) Thus, it appears the prosecutor is mistaken about whether Exhibit 1 was 
actually part of the PSI. 
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constitute new information; it simply repackaged the information that the State 
presented the first time around. And even if Exhibit 1 contained new information, it still 
failed to provide sufficient evidence to meet the State's fundamental burden of proof for 
the reason stated in the Court of Appeals' prior decision in this case. See Nelson, 2014 
WL 708467, at p.3. 
True, as the State points out, the Court of Appeals held in State v. Weaver that 
the prosecutor's certified statement was sufficient to support a restitution award. (See 
Resp. Br., pp.20-26 (citing State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 170-71 (Ct. App. 2014)).) 
However, the Weaver Court explained the reason the statement was sufficient in that 
case was it provided an actual accounting of the time the prosecutor spent working on 
that case: "The accounting parsed the prosecutor's time amongst eleven listed tasks 
accompanied by a brief description of each task and, in many cases, a date on which 
the task occurred." Weaver, 158 Idaho at 170-71. In addition. each task was 
accompanied by an indication of how many tenths of an hour were spent on the task. 
Id. at 170. 
Exhibit 1 does not contain those same specific accountings as it does not identify 
the separate tasks performed, the date on which they were performed, or the specific 
amount of time each task took. (See generally R., p.25.) Therefore, this case is 
distinguishable from Weaver, and Exhibit 1 is not sufficient to support the request for 
restitution. As such, the information the State presented below was not sufficient to 
meet the prosecutor's burden of proof, if it was properly considered at all. Either way, 
this Court should vacate the restitution pursuant to the law of the case doctrine and 
consistent with the Court of Appeals' previous decision in this case. 
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2. Since The Information In Exhibit 1 Was Not Accurate, It Is Not Sufficient 
To Meet The State's Fundamental Burden Of Proof And Support The 
Restitution Order In This Case 
Since the State bears the ultimate burden of proof, the information it submits 
must actually be sufficient to carry that burden. Obviously, if the information it presents 
is inaccurate, it will not be sufficient to meet that fundamental burden. In this case, the 
only information the State presented in support of the restitution request was the 
prosecutor's unsworn written statement of the time spent on this case and his rate of 
pay. 
Ms. Nelson challenged the reliability of that information below, pointing out that, if 
it were reviewed mathematically, it would incorrectly mean the prosecutor's annual 
salary was nearly $300,000. (R., p.33.) The district court rejected that challenge 
because Ms. Nelson had not presented evidence proving the prosecutor's assertion 
wrong. (R., p.40.) Ms. Nelson contends this improperly shifted the burden of proof. 
(App. Br., pp.26-27.) The State responds, contending the district court acted 
appropriately by requiring Ms. Nelson to have presented evidence to contradict the 
prosecutor's unsworn representation. (Resp. Br., pp.24-25.) The State fails to 
appreciate two aspects of challenges to the reliability of evidence which demonstrate its 
position is erroneous. 
First, it is directly contrary to Court of Appeals' precedent. As the Court of 
Appeals has explained, "[t]here is a distinction between a foundational challenge to the 
admission of unreliable evidence and an argument that the evidence which has been 
admitted is insufficiently reliable to prove a certain proposition." State v. Yeoumans, 
144 Idaho 871, 873 (Ct. App. 2007). While the former challenge must be preserved by 
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a sufficient challenge below, the latter, as a "challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
meet a party's burden of proof requires no specific action or argument below." Id. 
of that rule can be seen in State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687, 695 (Ct. App. 
2007), where the victim's affidavit claimed that the defendant had stolen various items. 
Id. The defendant argued that, absent an invoice or some other evidence tying those 
items to the defendant, the State had failed to carry its burden to prove its claim for 
restitution for those items. Id. The defendant did not present any evidence tending to 
disprove the victim's affidavit. See generally id. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals 
agreed with the defendant and reversed the restitution award for those items. Id. 
Thus, a defendant may successfully challenge the reliability of the State's 
evidence in regard to whether it satisfies the fundamental burden of proof in the 
restitution context simply by asserting the State's evidence is insufficient; she does not 
need to affirmatively disprove the State's claim for that restitution. See Yeomans, 144 
Idaho at 873; Smith, 144 Idaho at 695. Therefore, even though Ms. Nelson did not 
present evidence to prove the prosecutor's actual rate of pay, her argument that the 
State had failed to carry its burden to accurately prove the prosecutor's rate of pay was 
sufficient to challenge the reliability of the State's evidence. Thus, the State's argument, 
like the district court's decision before it, improperly flipped the burden of proof. ( See 
App. Br., pp.26-27.) 
Besides, the State's assertion in that regard is actually inaccurate; there was 
information in the documents considered by the district court - notably the transcripts of 
the prior discussion on restitution - which disproved the prosecutor's request. At the 
first hearing, the district court found, as a matter of fact, that "the loaded benefit rate of 
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an Ada County Prosecuting Attorney would come out at about $65 an hour."7 (Tr., p.29, 
That information in the record before the district court supported Ms. Nelson's 
contention that the claimed rate of pay $140 an hour was inaccurate. Therefore, 
there was information supporting Ms. Nelson's prima facie challenge to the reliability of 
the prosecutor's statement. That information, as well as Ms. Nelson's mathematical 
challenge, tended to show the prosecutor's request for $140 per hour was artificially 
inflated. Thus, the prosecutor, who bore the fundamental burden of proof to show the 
State was entitled to the credit it was claiming, bore the burden to present actual 
evidence in support of his claim for $140 per hour in this case. Since he did not, nor 
has the State tried to justify that claim on appeal (see generally Resp. Br.), the 
restitution award based on that claim should be vacated and the State should not be 
afforded a third opportunity to try and prove it on remand. 
This is particularly true because Ms. Nelson confirmed the validity of her 
challenge to the $140-an-hour claim on appeal. Compare Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873 
(holding that challenges to the sufficiency of the State's restitution evidence may be 
articulated on appeal without a challenge below). According to websites which actually 
track the relevant information, the prosecutor's claimed rate of pay was artificially 
inflated, as the prosecutor's claim of $140 per hour was five times higher than his actual 
rate of pay of $28 per hour. (See App. Br, p.25 (discussing this information in detail).) 
7 Ms. Nelson does not concede the district court's finding of $65 per hour was an 
accurate finding, since, as discussed infra, the prosecutor's actual rate of pay (i.e., his 
regular salary) was only $28 per hour. (See also App. Br., pp.21-22.) However, the fact 
that the district court initially considered $65 an hour to be the accurate rate of pay is 
still information tending to disprove the prosecutor's request for a pay rate of $140 an 
hour. 
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Therefore, Ms. Nelson has at least made a sufficient challenge to the reliability of the 
prosecutor's statement on appeal, and challenge is properly reviewed on its merits. 
Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873. The State has made no argument or presented any 
evidence contradicting the information identified on appeal. (See generally Resp. Br.) 
Thus, remembering that the State continues to bear the fundamental burden of proof in 
the restitution context, the restitution award based on that unreliable information 
regarding the prosecutor's rate of pay should be vacated. 
3. Since Exhibit 1 Includes Requests For Restitution For Time Spent 
Prosecuting Other Charges For Which Ms. Nelson Was Not Convicted, 
And Which Would Not Fall Under The Scope Of I.C. § 37-2732(k) Even If 
She Had Been, The Restitution Award Based On Exhibit 1 Is Erroneous 
The decision in Weaver belies the last of the State's arguments on appeal. The 
State attempted to refute Ms. Nelson's claim - that the restitution award was erroneous 
because it included time spent on the charges of injury to child for which Ms. Nelson 
was never convicted (App. Br., pp.28-30) - by arguing that requiring such an accounting 
is "unrealistic." (Resp. Br., p.25.) However, in Weaver, the Court of Appeals stated that 
is precisely the sort of accounting a defendant can expect in a restitution proceeding. 
Weaver, 158 Idaho at 170-71 ("The state's certified accounting of the time it spent 
prosecuting the case, even if only an estimate, constitutes substantial evidence .... 
There is little more that Weaver could reasonably expect as evidence in these 
circumstances.") (emphasis added). Therefore, the State's argument is contrary to 
precedent. 
Furthermore, that sort of accounting is actually required by the plain language of 
I. C. § 37-2732(k) because that statute only authorizes restitution for convictions 
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resulting "under this chapter" (dealing specifically with controlled substances) and 
other, expressly-identified code sections. The injury to child charges alleged in 
case do not fall under any of those code sections for which C § 37-2732(k) 
authorizes restitution (See Supp. R., pp.8-10, 34-35 (identifying the code sections 
relevant to the injury to child charges).) Since "[i]t is generally recognized that courts of 
criminal jurisdiction have no power or authority to direct reparations or restitution to a 
crime victim in the absence of a statutory provision to such effect," restitution for the 
time the prosecutor spent on the injury to child charges is improper. State v. Richmond, 
137 Idaho 35, 38 (Ct. App. 2002). Thus, restitution for the prosecutor's time spent only 
on the injury to child charges was not authorized under the plain language of the 
statute, even if Ms. Nelson had been convicted of those charges. As the Court of 
Appeals has aptly summarized in this regard, "when a defendant has been charged with 
multiple crimes and pleads guilty to part of the charges in exchange for dismissal of the 
remainder, restitution is not ordinarily awardable for loss or injury actually and 
proximately caused only by the offenses for which the charges were dismissed." 
Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 495-96 
For the State to suggest that the courts should ignore the scope of the relevant 
statutory authority just because it believes it is "unrealistic" for prosecutors to provide an 
accurate accounting of the time they spent prosecuting the offenses specifically 
identified in I.C. § 37-2732(k) is wholly improper. See Verska, 151 Idaho 893, 896 
(holding where the statutory language is unambiguous, the courts give effect to the 
plain language regardless of potential absurdity of doing so). Thus, defendants can 
properly demand accurate accountings of time spent on these cases, particularly where 
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I. § 37-2732(k) only authorizes restitution for the time spent prosecuting some of the 
charges. See Weaver, 158 Idaho at 170-71, Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 495-96. Since the 
restitution award in this case demonstrably includes the time the prosecutor spent on 
the injury to child charges (see App. Br., pp.28-30), time for which restitution is not 
statutorily-authorized, the State failed to meet its fundamental burden of proof regarding 
its request for restitution. Therefore, the order for that restitution should still be vacated. 
Since the State has already had two opportunities to meet its burden of proof and 
has failed both times, this Court should not remand to give it a third bite at the apple. 
(See App. Br., pp.32-33 (discussing in depth the precedent revealing this to be the 
proper remedy in cases such as this).) 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Nelson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order of restitution in 
this case. 
DATED this 19th day of November, 2015. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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